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As the Canadian policy of multiculturalism has 
existed for 50 years, many might ask, ‘what has 
it achieved?’ I argue that it is likely to have been 
effective at encouraging national identity, but 
why is this an achievement? To understand why, 
we need to know what national identity is, why 
governments should encourage it and why doing so 
is difficult; thus, I begin by briefly explaining these 
points. I then discuss the Canadian policy of multi-
culturalism, why it is likely to have been effective at 
encouraging national identity, and what the impli-
cations of this are.
I-NATIONAL IDENTITY
We think and talk about national identity in two 
related ways. First, we refer to a person’s national 
identity.1 This denotes part of what they are, just as 
their sexual or religious identity does; thus, a person 
with a Canadian identity might also say that they 
are Canadian. In doing so, they are saying that they 
are part of a political community that influences 
what they are as, for example, its legal and polit-
ical institutions regulate their behaviour and influ-
ence their ideas of what is acceptable and normal. 
But a person may neglect their national identity 
altogether until they work abroad and realize, for 
example, how Canadian they are; or they may think 
they have more than one national identity and feel 
both Quebecois and Canadian, as Quebec also 
socializes them using its own legal, political and 
educational institutions.
Second, we refer to a political community’s identity 
1 V. Uberoi, ‘National Identity-A Multiculturalist Approach’, Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 21:1, 2018. 
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3:17, 2015, pp. 8-9; D. Miller, Strangers in Our Midst, Harvard University Press, 2016, p. 28; D. Miller and S. Ali, ‘Testing the national identity argument’, European 
Political Science Review, 6:02, 2014, p. 254. See also K. Banting et al., ‘Beyond National Identity: Liberal Nationalism, Shared Membership and Solidarity’, in 
G. Gustavvson and D. Miller, Liberal Nationalism and Its Critics, Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 218.
and to Canada’s identity. This denotes what a polit-
ical community is and thus the features that we use 
to think of its individual members as a group, such 
as the territory they share, a religion or tendencies 
in thought and behaviour that are common among 
them, traditions of thought that they use to regu-
late their collective affairs, and so on. Such features 
are part of vague but recognizable conceptions of 
a political community’s identity that intellectuals 
clarify, and school syllabi promote. People also 
develop such conceptions over time and these in 
turn affect their national identity. Thus, a racial 
minority in the 1980s Britain may have thought 
of Britain as a place that excludes people like 
them, and not felt British. The two ways in which 
we think and talk about national identity are thus 
related. But why should governments encourage 
either of them?
Some say national identity aids the redistribution 
of wealth, but, as many now admit, the evidence to 
support this empirical claim is inconclusive;2 rather, 
note the following two reasons. First, citizens of a 
political community must exhibit unity, which is 
usually only the ability to assume they are a unit 
or a group when conceptualizing collective goals 
and collective challenges. In difficult times, such 
as war, citizens may need not only to assume that 
they are a group, but to explicitly think of them-
selves as one, and be loyal to one another. Hence, as 
with unity among family members or friends, unity 
among citizens often becomes more visible with 
“ If people’s conceptions of their political 
community include cultural minorities 
as normal and equal members of it, 
these conceptions help a culturally 
diverse citizenry to visualize themselves 
as a group.”
need. And those who, for example, ‘feel American’ 
often think of themselves as a group just like those 
who share a religious identity, and are ‘Muslim’, or 
a sexual identity, and are ‘gay’ do. They also often 
feel proud of one another’s achievements as they 
assume that they are a group.
Equally, if people’s conceptions of their political-
community include cultural minorities as normal 
and equal members of it, these conceptions help 
a culturally diverse citizenry to visualize them-
selves as a group. But those with such inclusive 
conceptions are also less likely to exclude and 
discriminate against minorities as minority cultural 
differences are not seen as something to fear or to 
avoid. National identity thus (I) helps to foster the 
unity that political life requires and, if inclusive, (II) 
can discourage an all-too-common fear of cultural 
differences among citizens. But there nonetheless 
remain the following obvious problems.
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People’s conceptions of their political community 
often focus solely on a dominant majority who, 
for example, might seem more ‘truly British’. This 
makes minorities seem like outsiders, thus exacer-
bating their exclusion and making them potentially 
unwilling to be part of a group that mistreats them. 
Thus, we saw how minorities don’t necessarily feel 
part of their political community, but also saw how 
some can neglect their national identity altogether.
No government can compel its citizens to feel 
Canadian, or to have an inclusive conception of 
their political community without unacceptable 
levels of coercion, and perhaps not even then. But 
it can encourage both practices despite the follow-
ing sorts of difficulties: a government may have 
few powers to encourage, for example, British 
identity in Scotland and risks antagonising those 
who feel more Scottish than British. It must also 
decide which inclusive conceptions of the political 
community will resonate with its citizens and how 
to promote them while assuaging majorities who 
are no longer the sole focus of such conceptions. It 
must also decide how the education system will be 
used to encourage national identity without indoc-
trinating children and while teaching them to think 
critically.3 These sorts of issues are difficult and 
the Canadian policy of multiculturalism addressed 
some of them.
3 I address some of these questions in V. Uberoi, ‘National Identity – A Multiculturalist Approach’. But see D. Miller’s seminal On Nationality, Oxford University 
Press, 1995. 
4 V. Uberoi, ‘Do Policies of Multiculturalism Change National Identities’, Political Quarterly, 79:3, 2008, p. 411.
5 V. Uberoi, ‘Multiculturalism and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’, Political Studies, 57:4, 2009, p. 809.
6 V. Uberoi, ‘Multiculturalism and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’, p. 808; L. Blanding, ‘Rebranding Canada: The Origins of the Canadian Multi-
culturalism Policy, 1945-74’, PhD Thesis, University of Victoria, 2013, pp. 238, 257.
II-THE CANADIAN POLICY OF MULTICULTURALISM
This policy was justified to Cabinet in 1971 as 
serving a number of Citizenship Objectives, one of 
which was developing ‘Canadian identity’.4 It was 
intended to promote a multicultural conception 
of Canada; thus, in Cabinet, ministers noted ‘the 
importance … of the policy as a new concept of the 
presentation of Canadianism’.5 Cultural agencies 
were subsequently funded to promote a multicul-
tural conception of Canada. ‘Intercultural exchanges’ 
and funding minority civil society cultural groups 
were part of the policy and implicitly conveyed 
such a conception, as they suggest that Canada is 
culturally diverse. This conception of Canada was 
promoted to stimulate people’s Canadian identi-
ties, and designers of the policy discussed creat-
ing a ‘meaningful Canadian consciousness’ and 
considered people becoming conscious of how they 
were a part of Canada.6 This continued in the 1988 
Multiculturalism Act that enshrined the policy in 
law.
Clause 31b of this Act calls multiculturalism a 
‘fundamental characteristic’ of Canada, and cabinet 
documents show how it was intended, inter alia, 
‘to convey a strong sense of legitimacy to those 
individuals and communities who feel and/or 
understand that either their culture or their race 
has limited their role and acceptance in Canadian 
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7 V. Uberoi, ‘Legislating Multiculturalism and Nationhood’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 49:2, 2016 p. 277.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 V. Uberoi, ‘Multiculturalism and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’, p. 808; L. Blanding, ‘Rebranding Canada’, pp. 107, 162.
11 See W. Kymlicka’s excellent ‘The Precarious Resilience on Multiculturalism in Canada’, American Review of Canadian Studies, 51:1, 2021, p. 124 as he notes 
the following survey data: Environics Institute for Survey Research, 2015, ‘Canadian Public Opinion about Immigration and Multiculturalism’, Environ-
ics Institute – Focus Canada Spring 2015 Survey on Immigration-Multiculturalism – FINAL REPORT – June 30-2015, p. 2; Environics Institute for Survey 
Research, 2018, ‘Canada’s World Survey 2018 Final Report’, April 2018, pp. 31, 38. For older evidence from the International Social Survey Programme see V. 
Uberoi, ‘Do Policies of Multiculturalism Change National Identities’, footnote 30, p. 416.
12 See Kymlicka ‘The Precarious Resilience on Multiculturalism in Canada’, p. 125; R. Besco and E. Tolley, ‘Does Everyone Cheer? The Politics of Immigration 
and Multiculturalism in Canada’, Federalism and the Welfare State in a Multicultural World, in E. Goodyear-Grant et al., McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2019, 
p. 303; Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos, ‘The Foundations, Limits, and Consequences of Immigration Exceptionalism in Canada’, American Review of Canadian 
Studies, 51:1, 2021, p. 13.
society’.7 The policy in the Act also helps to ensure 
that all Canadians, including minorities, can gain 
employment in federal departments and agen-
cies so as to aid not only employment equity, but 
‘nation-building’. This is because inclusion in the 
‘institutional life of the nation’ was thought to 
strengthen the ‘sense’ among minorities of ‘being 
integral’ to the ‘Canadian nation’ while exclu-
sion from these institutions was thought to do 
the opposite.8 Those drafting the Act thought that 
federal institutions are part of how Canada is often 
understood by Canadians, and minorities were 
more likely to feel part of how Canada is often 
understood if these institutions included them.9 The 
policy of multiculturalism that still exists in the Act 
was designed to promote a conception of Canada 
and to stimulate people’s national identities, but 
has it been effective in doing so?
The efficacy of this policy, like many others, is diffi-
cult to prove definitively. But it would be counter-
intuitive to claim that the federal government and 
cultural agencies promoting such a conception of 
Canada for 50 years has had no effect. The likely 
nature of this effect can be discerned after we note 
that despite the absence of relevant survey data 
for the 1950s and 1960s, historical evidence indi-
cates that in this period a multicultural conception 
of Canada was popular only among some minority 
civil society groups.10 Today surveys have repeat-
edly shown for some time that multiculturalism is a 
national symbol for a majority of Canadians and an 
important feature of how they conceive of Canada.11 
This conception of Canada is held widely but not 
universally: 30% may oppose it. Nor is it deeply 
held by all its advocates as it does not alter some of 
their views about certain groups, such as Muslims, 
and many such advocates still believe that immi-
grants should ‘blend in’.12 Yet if conceptions of 
the country that excluded minorities were more 
“ Inclusion in the ‘institutional life of 
the nation’ was thought to strengthen 
the ‘sense’ among minorities of ‘being 
integral’ to the ‘Canadian nation’ while 
exclusion from these institutions was 
thought to do the opposite.”
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widespread, such beliefs and discrimination would 
presumably be too. Thus, this widely yet not always 
deeply held inclusive conception of Canada still 
seems ‘consequential’.13 Furthermore, the multi-
culturalism policy is likely to have been effective 
in helping to generate this widely held conception 
over 50 years in something like the following way.
Any conception of Canada that this policy promoted 
would seem artificial if inconsistent with popular 
understandings of Canada’s history, people’s recur-
ring experiences and other features of Canada, such 
as high levels of immigration. But people ignore 
such features when they cling to older conceptions 
of their country, or to conceptions of it that focus on 
other features, as occurs in other culturally diverse 
countries.14 Yet when governments promote a multi-
cultural conception of the country for 50 years, this 
conception becomes difficult to ignore and encour-
ages people to take account of it. Canadian history 
and experiences, increasing immigration and so 
“ Today surveys have repeatedly shown 
for some time that multiculturalism  
is a national symbol for a majority of 
Canadians and an important feature  
of how they conceive of Canada.”
13 Kymlicka ‘The Precarious Resilience on Multiculturalism in Canada’, p. 125.
14 P. Norris and R. Inglehart, Cultural Backlash, Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 182, 200.
15 Scholars who make this claim are discussed in K. McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 131.
16 K. Banting and W. Kymlicka, ‘Do Policies of Multiculturalism Erode the Welfare State? In Cultural Diversity Versus Economic Solidarity, ed. P. Van Parjis, Doe-
beck, University Press, 2004, pp. 251-252; D. Miller, ‘Immigrants, Nations and Citizenship’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 16:4, 2012, p. 380.
17 G. Levey, Political Theory and Australian Multiculturalism, Berghahn Books, 2008, pp. 266-267.
on, do not inevitably lead people to acquire a multi-
cultural conception of Canada, but they make the 
multicultural conceptions of Canada that succes-
sive governments promote seem plausible; thus, 
many Canadians, we saw, now accept them. In this 
way, the policy of multiculturalism is likely to have 
been effective at encouraging national identity.
Crude claims about this policy undermining 
national identity therefore seem mistaken,15 as it is 
instead likely to have been effective at encouraging 
such identity. But what about subtler and more 
general claims in which policies of multicultural-
ism are said to uphold minority rights but should be 
accompanied by nation-building policies that foster 
unity and a national culture?16 This claim assumes 
that, unlike nation-building policies, policies of 
multiculturalism are divisive; yet the Canadian 
policy of multiculturalism seemed to foster unity by 
encouraging national identity. It also assumes that 
policies of multiculturalism focus on minorities. 
However the Canadian policy of multiculturalism 
fostered national identity for all citizens. Knowing 
what the Canadian policy of multiculturalism is 
likely to have achieved disturbs our assumptions 
about such policies and their differences from 
nation-building policies, especially once we note 
how a policy of multiculturalism promoted national 
identity in Australia too.17
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18 V. Uberoi and T. Modood, ‘Inclusive Britishness- A Multiculturalist Advance’, Political Studies, 61:1, 2013.
19 Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka, ‘Is There Really a Retreat From Multiculturalism Policies? New Evidence from the Multiculturalism Policy Index’, Compara-
tive European Politics, 11:5, 2013.
Recall also that after 50 years, a multicultural 
conception of Canada is widely but not deeply held 
by all its advocates, while others reject it. Those 
who operate this policy of multiculturalism thus 
still have work to do to encourage a widely held, 
inclusive conception of Canada to become more 
universally and deeply held by all Canadians. 
Equally, those outside Canada who want inclusive 
conceptions of their own country to become wide-
spread18 should note how long this can take, and 
how it is aided by a policy of multiculturalism. Such 
policies may seem inconceivable elsewhere, but 
Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka have shown how 
the measures of such a policy have increased in 
different countries despite criticism of them.19 Such 
policies continue to proliferate, and the Canadian 
policy of multiculturalism suggests they can endure 
and be effective at encouraging inclusive forms of 
national identity.
